Supply-chain attack · 16 Nov 2026
Short answer: you are hit if, since 10 November 2026, any repository in your organization received a pull request titled docs: dependency audit notes, a wfx-docs branch, or commits titled ci: refresh build cache, chore: add ci helper or chore: add dependency audit workflow. A probe PR alone means the author's GitHub account is compromised. If the payload ran, treat every secret, token and cloud role those workflows could reach as stolen, and remove the AWS and Azure backdoors it plants, because rotating secrets does not remove them.
Aikido Security disclosed the campaign on 12 November and named it wfx-loot, after the attacker's own labels: the stealer calls itself "wfx". Endor Labs published a detailed timeline and payload analysis the same day. Both date the first probe pull requests to about 12:45 UTC on 10 November 2026.
This was not a poisoned package: the attacker logged in as real developers with stolen GitHub credentials and pushed code where they could already write. Neither research team knows yet how the credentials were stolen. One victim reported a leaked GitHub CLI OAuth token, and Endor notes the accounts belong to developers whose accounts were compromised in earlier supply-chain attacks.
The numbers, which both teams call lower bounds because the attacker deletes workflow runs and logs:
Two packages have confirmed malicious versions: Packagist digitalelvis/neuronai-studio 3.14.3, and the Go module github.com/onuragtas/docker-env v1.0.278 and v1.0.280. Aikido sees overlap with October's GhostAction wave, including more than 100 repositories where the stealer was added to GhostAction's workflow files, but assesses the two as likely different actors.
First, a harmless-looking pull request titled docs: dependency audit notes from a branch called wfx-docs. It confirms the account can write to the repository. Then one of three payload variants is pushed to the default branch:
ci: refresh build cache: about 1,500 lines added to an existing workflow, as steps named "Pass runtime" and "Restore cache j632".chore: add ci helper: a .ci-xxxxxx.sh script and a postinstall hook in package.json, so it also runs on developer laptops.chore: add dependency audit workflow: a new .github/workflows/build-audit-xxxxxx.yml on a throwaway chore/xxxxxxxx branch.A ci: restore or ci: cleanup commit then reverts the change, typically within seconds to a minute, and the run and its logs are deleted. Endor calls this the "sandwich commit"; The Hacker News reports a later analysis found some changes left in place longer. In the WebdriverIO project, two commits were pushed under the project's bot account and bypassed branch protection; a contributor flagged them about 20 minutes later.
The stealer collects Actions secrets and variables (the injected step passes toJSON(secrets) and toJSON(vars)), the GITHUB_TOKEN, OIDC and runtime tokens, credential files for AWS, Azure, GCP, Docker, Kubernetes, npm, PyPI, SSH, Vault and Terraform, .env and key files, AI provider keys and runner process memory. On self-hosted runners it also reads instance metadata credentials. It then exchanges OIDC tokens for cloud access, creates AWS access keys, rewrites an AWS role's trust policy to "Principal": {"AWS": "*"}, adds Azure federated identity credentials named wfx-ci-…, and can forge "success" status checks to get past branch protection. Data leaves as a gzipped tarball over HTTP POST to /exfil on port 8080; Endor sees later builds also sending a copy to Telegram.
Endor's commands, which work from any machine with gh and a clone:
# probe pull requests in your org
gh search prs "docs: dependency audit notes" --owner <org> --created ">=2026-11-10"
# payload and cleanup commits on any branch
git log --all --since=2026-11-10 --format='%h %ad %an %s' | grep -E 'ci: refresh build cache|chore: add ci helper|chore: add dependency audit workflow|ci: restore|ci: cleanup'
# attacker branches still on the remote
git ls-remote origin 'refs/heads/wfx-docs' 'refs/heads/chore/*' 'refs/heads/ci-check-*'
# install-hook variant
grep -rn --include=package.json -E '"postinstall"\s*:\s*".*\.ci-[a-z0-9]{6}\.sh' .
Run these across every repository. Missing artifacts prove little, since the logs are deleted; Aikido says gaps in workflow run numbers right after the attacker's commits are the more reliable sign. Also block egress to the IPs published by both teams (194.150.166[.]244, 18.143.168[.]96, 153.75.82[.]159, all on port 8080) and search proxy or firewall logs for them. If your developers use PHP or Go, check lockfiles for the two package versions above.
wfx-docs, chore/* and ci-check-* branches. Confirm the revert really removed the payload, and review any status checks on those commits.npm install or pnpm install on an affected commit is compromised. Rebuild or wipe it; don't just delete the script.Rotate every secret and variable the affected repositories and their organization could read, including npm, PyPI, Packagist and crates publish tokens, cloud keys and AI service keys. Then go looking for the persistence, because it survives rotation:
CreateAccessKey and UpdateAssumeRolePolicy, and AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity from the GitHub OIDC provider with sessions named wfx-*. Any role that trusts "AWS": "*" is a door left open to every AWS account. Delete keys you didn't create.az ad app federated-credential list --id <appId>) and remove any named wfx-ci-…. If Entra audit logs go to Sentinel, a broad first pass:AuditLogs
| where TimeGenerated >= datetime(2026-11-10)
| where tostring(TargetResources) has "wfx-ci"
| project TimeGenerated, OperationName, InitiatedBy, TargetResources
GenerateAccessToken and SignJwt calls, and Vault JWT logins from the GitHub OIDC issuer, in the same window.If the stolen secrets reached production systems or customer data, the clock for GDPR breach notification and, if you are in scope of NIS2, incident reporting may already be running. Our incident clock works out the deadlines from the moment you became aware.
Endor's hardening list matches what we'd ask of any regulated pipeline:
.github/workflows/** and block direct pushes to the default branch, admins included.GITHUB_TOKEN to read-only and grant write per job.npm ci --ignore-scripts in CI and alert when a new lifecycle hook appears in package.json.We'd add one of our own: never pass toJSON(secrets) to a step, which hands the whole secret store to whatever runs there. Give each step only the secret it needs.
The weak link here was a developer's GitHub session, not your code; long-lived CI secrets turned it into cloud access. We covered how to get secrets out of pipelines in Secrets in your repos, and the Entra side of app credentials in Stolen Entra ID app secrets. For PCI DSS teams, a CI runner that can deploy into the cardholder data environment is in scope in practice, and its workflow files deserve the same change control as the application.
wfx-loot is Aikido's name for a campaign that began on 10 November 2026, in which an attacker used 4,837 stolen GitHub accounts to push a CI secret stealer into repositories those accounts could write to. The stealer, which calls itself "wfx", ran in at least 1,806 repositories.
No. Rotation is necessary but not enough, because the stealer also adds AWS access keys, opens AWS role trust policies to any account and adds wfx-ci-… federated credentials in Azure. Remove those in every cloud account, and lock the compromised GitHub accounts too.
As of 12 November, confirmed malicious versions are Packagist digitalelvis/neuronai-studio 3.14.3 and the Go module github.com/onuragtas/docker-env v1.0.278 and v1.0.280. No npm package is named yet, but at least 50 hijacked accounts publish to npm, PyPI, crates and other registries, so watch the researchers' updates.
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