On 16 November 2026 an attacker put malicious JavaScript into the "Project JavaScript" of Optimizely Web customer projects. Optimizely's own CDN then served it to visitors of 178 organisations, including the BBC, CNN, Zoom, HSBC and Salesforce.
The code swapped crypto wallet addresses, skimmed cards typed into sites' own forms, stole readable cookies and screenshots, and pushed iOS exploit chains to iPhones.
Optimizely says the attacker exploited a vulnerability in its Experimentation account signup flow, and that it has deployed a fix and notified affected customers. Most snippets were clean by about 21:52 UTC the same day.
If you use Optimizely Web: inspect Project JavaScript, rotate access, and treat card data and non-HttpOnly cookies from 16 November as exposed. If you take payments online, this is exactly what PCI DSS 6.4.3 and 11.6.1 are for.
You are affected if your website loads Optimizely Web Experimentation and Optimizely notified you, or if your snippet's Project JavaScript contained code you didn't write on 16 November 2026. Your users are affected if they visited one of the 178 organisations' sites that day and copied a crypto address, typed card details into a site form, or browsed on an unpatched iPhone. Each infected site was exposed for roughly 13 to 17 hours, from first injection to clean-up. Optimizely says the root cause, a flaw in its account signup flow, is fixed.
What happened
Optimizely Web works by loading a JavaScript snippet from cdn.optimizely.com on the customer's pages. Each project has a "Project JavaScript" field, where customers can add code that runs on every page. The attacker got write access to that field in 188 snippets across 178 organisations and inserted a loader. The CDN served exactly what it was given, so there was no cache poisoning. The malicious code arrived from Optimizely's own domain, with Optimizely's certificate, which is why most security controls trusted it (SecurityOnline).
Optimizely told Gizmodo it had "identified a security incident in which an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in the Experimentation account signup flow". The party "added malicious JavaScript to some customer projects". The company says it "blocked access to the vulnerable path and deployed a fix" and notified all affected customers (Gizmodo). The campaign was found and tracked by Scott Helme of Report URI, which sells script-monitoring products, as Gizmodo notes.
Timeline (16 November 2026, UTC)
04:21: earliest injection found, in the BBC's snippet.
05:23: the attacker registers the payload domain 1688360[.]cc.
13:03: stolen crypto starts moving to exchange deposit addresses.
13:43: card skimmer added to the payload, which was rebuilt about 26 times during the day.
19:25: attacker wallets hold about $7,040.
20:40–21:10: mass clean-up; 169 snippets still infected at 20:56.
21:52: one infected snippet left.
Sources: Cyber Kendra and Cyber Security News, both summarising Report URI's timeline. A re-check just after midnight found the sampled snippets clean, but the payload server was still answering (DEV Community). An earlier wave on 13–16 November used other third-party scripts (Kissmetrics, StorifyMe, Minute Media) and the injector webshell[.]lol.
What the code did
Crypto clipper: replaced valid wallet addresses for eight chains in page text, form fields, the clipboard and outgoing requests.
Card skimmer: captured card number, expiry and CVV from forms on the site itself. Card fields inside a cross-origin payment iframe (Stripe, Adyen hosted fields) were out of reach.
Theft of cookies, URLs and screenshots: sent page URLs, any cookie without the HttpOnly flag, and an html2canvas screenshot to the attacker.
iOS exploit routing: on iPhones and iPads it loaded the Coruna chain for iOS 13–17 and DarkSword for iOS 18 up to 18.6, and fingerprinting only on iOS 26. Delivery was observed; successful exploitation has not been confirmed.
Why most Content Security Policies didn't help
Report URI checked the affected organisations' own sites (via Cyber Kendra):
No CSP at all: 68 organisations.
CSP blocked the attack: only 24, about 15%.
Allowing cdn.optimizely.com was useless, because that is where the code came from.
'strict-dynamic' let the payload download through, because a trusted script may load further scripts.
'unsafe-eval', which Optimizely's documentation asks customers to allow, let an inline fallback copy run even where the download was blocked.
A tight connect-src stopped exfiltration of cards, cookies and screenshots, but not the in-page address swap.
Subresource Integrity can't help either: the vendor file changes legitimately all the time. A CSP is a seatbelt here, not a cure. What works is limiting which third-party scripts run on sensitive pages at all, plus monitoring what actually arrives in the browser.
If you use Optimizely Web: do this now
Inspect every project. Check Project JavaScript and every experiment's custom code for 1688360, atob(, eval, or script tags you didn't add. Check the snippet as served, too, since the inline fallback needs no external domain.
Read the change history. Optimizely's change history shows who changed Project JavaScript and when, and whether it came through the API or the web interface.
Rotate access. Review users, API tokens and integrations with write access. Rotate tokens and remove accounts you don't recognise.
Block the infrastructure at the proxy, DNS filter and CSP report rules: 1688360[.]cc, 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu, eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu, l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo[.]icu, webshell[.]lol.
Search your logs (CSP reports, proxy, WAF, SIEM) from 13 to 17 November for those domains and for requests to /card.php, /hit.php or track.js.
Treat data as exposed. That covers card data typed into your own forms on 16 November, and session tokens in cookies without HttpOnly. Rotate sessions, and work out whether customers, your acquirer or regulators must be told.
The compliance angle: PCI DSS, GDPR, NIS2
PCI DSS 4.x requirement 6.4.3: every script on a payment page must be authorised, integrity-checked and inventoried with a justification. Requirement 11.6.1 requires a mechanism that detects unauthorised changes to payment pages as the browser receives them. A testing tool injecting a skimmer into a checkout page is precisely the scenario these two cover. If an experimentation snippet runs on your payment pages, either justify it or remove it there. If you're not sure, check your SAQ scope with your QSA. (PCI SSC document library)
GDPR: stolen cookies, card data and screenshots of logged-in pages are personal data. If your site was affected, the 72-hour notification clock under Article 33 may have started when you were notified. The incident clock calculates the deadlines.
NIS2: supply-chain security is one of the explicit risk-management measures in Article 21(2)(d). A marketing script with write access to every page is a supplier, and belongs in your supplier inventory and risk assessment.
For users of the affected sites
Update iPhones and iPads to iOS 18.7.3 or later, or iOS 26.3 or later.
Check card statements for charges after 16 November, and replace the card if you typed it into an affected site's own form that day.
Check crypto transfers you made from an address copied on an affected site. Always confirm the recipient on a hardware wallet screen; completed transfers can't be reversed.
Third-party scripts are part of your attack surface the same way your servers are. If you want to know what your pages actually load, our stack check and radar track exploited vulnerabilities in the products you run, and we do script inventories as part of a PCI DSS engagement.
Questions
What is OPTIMJACK?
OPTIMJACK is the name researchers gave a supply-chain attack on 16 November 2026. Malicious JavaScript was injected into Optimizely Web customer projects and served from Optimizely's CDN to visitors of 178 organisations. It stole crypto, card data and cookies, and delivered iOS exploits.
Was my card stolen in the Optimizely attack?
Only if you typed card details into an affected site's own payment form on 16 November 2026. Card fields hosted by a payment provider in a separate frame were out of reach. Watch your statement, and ask your bank for a new card if you're unsure.
How did attackers get into Optimizely?
Optimizely says an unauthorised party exploited a vulnerability in its Experimentation account signup flow, which let it add JavaScript to some customer projects. The company says the path is blocked and fixed, and affected customers were notified.
Do you know every script on your payment pages?
We inventory third-party scripts, set up a CSP that actually blocks, and put change detection on payment pages, which is what PCI DSS 6.4.3 and 11.6.1 require and what would have flagged this attack within minutes.