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Supply-chain attack · 17 Nov 2026

OPTIMJACK: malware served through Optimizely to 178 websites. Are you affected?

, Gociux · 17 Nov 2026 · 7 min read

TL;DR

You are affected if your website loads Optimizely Web Experimentation and Optimizely notified you, or if your snippet's Project JavaScript contained code you didn't write on 16 November 2026. Your users are affected if they visited one of the 178 organisations' sites that day and copied a crypto address, typed card details into a site form, or browsed on an unpatched iPhone. Each infected site was exposed for roughly 13 to 17 hours, from first injection to clean-up. Optimizely says the root cause, a flaw in its account signup flow, is fixed.

What happened

Optimizely Web works by loading a JavaScript snippet from cdn.optimizely.com on the customer's pages. Each project has a "Project JavaScript" field, where customers can add code that runs on every page. The attacker got write access to that field in 188 snippets across 178 organisations and inserted a loader. The CDN served exactly what it was given, so there was no cache poisoning. The malicious code arrived from Optimizely's own domain, with Optimizely's certificate, which is why most security controls trusted it (SecurityOnline).

Optimizely told Gizmodo it had "identified a security incident in which an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in the Experimentation account signup flow". The party "added malicious JavaScript to some customer projects". The company says it "blocked access to the vulnerable path and deployed a fix" and notified all affected customers (Gizmodo). The campaign was found and tracked by Scott Helme of Report URI, which sells script-monitoring products, as Gizmodo notes.

Timeline (16 November 2026, UTC)

Sources: Cyber Kendra and Cyber Security News, both summarising Report URI's timeline. A re-check just after midnight found the sampled snippets clean, but the payload server was still answering (DEV Community). An earlier wave on 13–16 November used other third-party scripts (Kissmetrics, StorifyMe, Minute Media) and the injector webshell[.]lol.

What the code did

Why most Content Security Policies didn't help

Report URI checked the affected organisations' own sites (via Cyber Kendra):

Subresource Integrity can't help either: the vendor file changes legitimately all the time. A CSP is a seatbelt here, not a cure. What works is limiting which third-party scripts run on sensitive pages at all, plus monitoring what actually arrives in the browser.

If you use Optimizely Web: do this now

  1. Inspect every project. Check Project JavaScript and every experiment's custom code for 1688360, atob(, eval, or script tags you didn't add. Check the snippet as served, too, since the inline fallback needs no external domain.
  2. Read the change history. Optimizely's change history shows who changed Project JavaScript and when, and whether it came through the API or the web interface.
  3. Rotate access. Review users, API tokens and integrations with write access. Rotate tokens and remove accounts you don't recognise.
  4. Block the infrastructure at the proxy, DNS filter and CSP report rules: 1688360[.]cc, 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu, eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu, l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo[.]icu, webshell[.]lol.
  5. Search your logs (CSP reports, proxy, WAF, SIEM) from 13 to 17 November for those domains and for requests to /card.php, /hit.php or track.js.
  6. Treat data as exposed. That covers card data typed into your own forms on 16 November, and session tokens in cookies without HttpOnly. Rotate sessions, and work out whether customers, your acquirer or regulators must be told.

The compliance angle: PCI DSS, GDPR, NIS2

For users of the affected sites

Third-party scripts are part of your attack surface the same way your servers are. If you want to know what your pages actually load, our stack check and radar track exploited vulnerabilities in the products you run, and we do script inventories as part of a PCI DSS engagement.

Questions

What is OPTIMJACK?

OPTIMJACK is the name researchers gave a supply-chain attack on 16 November 2026. Malicious JavaScript was injected into Optimizely Web customer projects and served from Optimizely's CDN to visitors of 178 organisations. It stole crypto, card data and cookies, and delivered iOS exploits.

Was my card stolen in the Optimizely attack?

Only if you typed card details into an affected site's own payment form on 16 November 2026. Card fields hosted by a payment provider in a separate frame were out of reach. Watch your statement, and ask your bank for a new card if you're unsure.

How did attackers get into Optimizely?

Optimizely says an unauthorised party exploited a vulnerability in its Experimentation account signup flow, which let it add JavaScript to some customer projects. The company says the path is blocked and fixed, and affected customers were notified.

Do you know every script on your payment pages?

We inventory third-party scripts, set up a CSP that actually blocks, and put change detection on payment pages, which is what PCI DSS 6.4.3 and 11.6.1 require and what would have flagged this attack within minutes.

Request a quote →

Sources

Developing story, last checked 17 Nov 2026 around 04:00 UTC.